The reform of accounting standards and audit pricing  by Zhu, Kai & Sun, Hong
China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 187–198Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirectChina Journal of Accounting Research
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /c jarThe reform of accounting standards and audit pricing
Kai Zhu a, Hong Sun b,⇑
a Institute of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China
bSchool of Accountancy, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C TArticle history:
Received 3 November 2011
Revised 29 May 2012
Accepted 29 May 2012
Available online 24 July 2012
JEL classiﬁcation:
L11
M42
M48
Keywords:
Reform of accounting standards
Audit market
Industry structure
Audit pricing1755-3091/$ - see front matter  2012 China Jo
Hong Kong. Production and hosting by Elsev
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2012.05.002
⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: aczhuk@mail.shufe.edu.c
Production and hosting byThis paper focuses on the reform of accounting standards in China in 2007 and
investigates its impact on equilibrium pricing in the audit market. We ﬁnd that
the concentration of the audit market and the probability of issuing modiﬁed
audit opinions do not signiﬁcantly change, but that audit fees increase signif-
icantly after the adoption of the new accounting standards in China. Deeper
analysis suggests that (1) the implementation of the new IFRS-based Chinese
Accounting Standards (CASs) has increased the market risk faced by listed
ﬁrms and thus auditors’ expected audit risk, causing an increase in audit fees,
and (2) the degree of the increase in audit fees is positively related to the
adjusted diﬀerence between net income according to the old CAS before
2007 and the new CAS after 2007. We thus conclude that the reform has
had a signiﬁcant impact on audit pricing in China.
 2012 China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen
University and City University of Hong Kong. Production and hosting by
Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
This study investigates the impact of the adoption of the new accounting standards in China in 2007 on
audit pricing. Adopting or widely drawing on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) has
become the trend in accounting standards in the current global capital market (Daske et al., 2008; Barth
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information quality or the resource allocation eﬃciency of the capital market (Dechow et al., 2009; Barth and
Taylor, 2009; Xianjie, 2009; Kai et al., 2009). As a result, it is necessary to comprehensively test the impact of
the change in accounting standards on the use of accounting information.
Accounting standards are an important basis that auditors use to issue audit opinions, so any change in
accounting standards will aﬀect the working base of auditors directly and thus the structure of the entire audit
industry. We investigate how a change in accounting standards aﬀects audit pricing from three dimensions: the
concentration of the audit market, the attributes of the audit product and audit risk. Summary statistics show
that audit fees clearly increased following the adoption of the new accounting standards. However, the con-
centration of the audit market has not changed. Product heterogeneity, measured as the proportion of mod-
iﬁed audit opinions (MAOs), decreased. We thus conclude that the impact of the adoption of the new
accounting standards on audit pricing has mainly occurred due to a change in expected audit risk.
We also discuss how the adoption of the new accounting standards in China has aﬀected audit market pric-
ing strategy according to economic theory. Based on previous relevant research, we argue that the adoption of
fair value measurement in the new accounting standards makes ﬁrms disclose more information about their
market risk, which increases the expected audit risk of auditors and also audit fees. The original sample that
we select includes all listed ﬁrms in the A share market in China between 2004 and 2008. We use the same
method as Kai et al. (2009) and employ the diﬀerence between net income under the old accounting standards
and net income under the new accounting standards to measure the degree of the impact on earnings infor-
mation. The results suggest that the larger the diﬀerence in net income between the old and new accounting
standards, the larger the change in audit fees. That is to say, the adoption of the new CAS has had a signiﬁcant
impact on equilibrium pricing in the audit market and has increased audit fees.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes characteristics of the industry struc-
ture of the audit market before and after the reform of the accounting standards in 2007. Section 3 reviews the
relevant literature and develops the hypothesis. Section 4 discusses the research design. Section 5 presents the
empirical results and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Audit market structure: Summary analysis
The independent audit opinions oﬀered by auditors are based on the legitimacy, rationality and consistency
of the accounting information disclosed by ﬁrms. Accounting standards are the main benchmark used to
assess the quality of accounting information. Changes in accounting standards not only lead to changes in
the recording, measuring and reporting of ﬁnancial statements, but also directly inﬂuence auditors’ work
and the competitive behavior of auditors. This can lead to certain problems. For example, the adoption of
IFRS may create more space for auditors to express a reasonable professional judgment, but this may confer
a competitive advantage on high-quality auditors. Further, changes in standards may inﬂuence the diﬀerences
between the audit products provided by auditors, which may cause the type and structure of audit opinions to
change. The reform of Chinese accounting standards, in particular, may have aﬀected the expected audit risk
of auditors and in turn increase the audit fees paid by ﬁrms.
If the adoption of new accounting standards has aﬀected the equilibrium in audit pricing, it is necessary to
evaluate the characteristics both of the supply side and demand side of audit services. This study assumes the
main characteristics of the supply side to be audit market concentration and audit product diﬀerentiation, and
the main characteristic of the demand side to be audit risk. If audit prices increase due to the increased con-
centration of the audit market and diﬀerentiation of audit products, then we can conclude that it may lead to
market monopoly or market segmentation. Thus, the adoption of new accounting standards may decrease the
resource allocation eﬃciency of the audit market. Conversely, if an increase in audit risk leads to an increase in
the marginal cost of audit services, that is, if audit fees increase as compensation for the additional risk
assumed by auditors, then the equilibrium price of audit services will remain eﬀective, which suggests that
the adoption of new accounting standards does not change the resource allocation eﬃciency of the audit
market.
At the beginning of 2006, the Ministry of Finance issued the new Chinese Accounting Standards (CASs),
comprising one basic standard and 38 speciﬁc standards, which listed ﬁrms were required to fully follow from
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new standards aﬀects equilibrium pricing in the audit market. We ﬁrst look at whether the reform of account-
ing standards has aﬀected audit fees.2.1. Audit fees
We summarize the audit fees paid by listed ﬁrms between 2002 and 2009 (see Chart 1). Before the account-
ing standards reform (2002–2006), the average fee paid by listed ﬁrms for audit services was 6,00,000 yuan,
whereas the average fee in 2007 was 8,40,000 yuan. Chart 1 clearly shows that audit fees increased sharply
in 2007, but in 2008 and 2009 were more or less the same as in 2007. The price change corresponds to the time
when listed ﬁrms were required to follow the new accounting rules. We thus conclude that the reform of the
CAS has aﬀected pricing in the audit market.
The price of audit products is determined by both the supply side and demand side. We argue that the main
characteristics of the supply side are audit market concentration and audit product diﬀerentiation, and that
audit risk is the main characteristic of the demand side of audit services. If the change in the CAS has aﬀected
audit fees, it must also be the case that the change in the CAS has led to a change in the concentration of the
audit market, audit product diﬀerentiation or audit risk, or a combination of these, which in turn relates to a
change in the ﬁnal pricing of audits, as shown in the following diagram.2.2. Audit market concentration
The new CAS implemented from 2007 onward are very diﬀerent to the old CAS. First, many of the new
accounting methods give ﬁrms more discretionary power. For example, according to the new rules, the con-
solidation diﬀerence in an acquisition at a premium is deﬁned as goodwill. Intangible assets such as goodwill
and trademarks need not be amortized and need only be evaluated annually. The impairment, if any, must be
extracted. Further, one of the most important characteristics of the new CAS is the use of fair value as a new
measurement attribute, which gives ﬁrms more room to change their accounting policy. Although the rules on
asset write-downs reduce the opportunity for income management, the rules on the measurement of fair value,Chart 1. Average audit price by year.
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ization of borrowing costs increase the opportunity for income management among listed ﬁrms.
When ﬁrms comply with the new CAS to account for transactions, auditors must use more of their profes-
sional judgment in the audit process. As a consequence, high-quality audit ﬁrms may possess a greater com-
petitive advantage, which will improve their market share and alter the concentration of the audit market.
We use the ratio of revenue of the four (ten) largest audit ﬁrms (“Big Four” and “Big Ten”) to the 100 larg-
est audit ﬁrms as the proxy for audit market concentration (see Chart 2). Past studies usually consider the Big
Four to be a measure of high-quality audit ﬁrms, which is the reason why we use the ratio of the revenue of Big
Four (Ten) to the 100 largest audit ﬁrms to measure audit market concentration.
The largest 100 audit ﬁrms are ranked based on the revenue of audit ﬁrms in a ﬁscal year. This information
comes from the “Information on the National Top 100 Accounting Firms” announced by the Chinese Insti-
tute of Certiﬁed Public Accountants (CICPA). Between 2002 and 2009, the four largest ﬁrms were Price
Waterhouse Coopers, KPMG, Deloitte and Ernst and Young. The remaining six ﬁrms in the Big Ten changed
every year.
Chart 2 suggests that the concentration of the Big Four increased year by year in the sample period. Their
market share was 36.98% in 2002, reached 54.72% in 2007 and then began to decrease. The ratio in 2009 was
44.3%. Using the information on the Big Ten to measure market concentration produces a similar result. We
thus conclude that the adoption of the new CAS has not aﬀected the concentration of the audit market
signiﬁcantly.
In accordance with the stipulation of the Ministry of Finance, listed ﬁrms began to follow the new CAS
from 2007. The revenue of audit ﬁrms announced by CICPA include audit fees from non-listed ﬁrms, which
may not match our sample ﬁrms, so we use another proxy for audit market concentration to reﬂect the inﬂu-
ence of the adoption of the new accounting standards on the structure of the audit market: the total number of
listed ﬁrms audited by the Big Four (Big Ten).
In Chart 3, we calculate the ratio of the number of listed ﬁrms audited by the Big Four to the number of all
listed ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that the ratio does not change signiﬁcantly after the adoption of the new CAS, but that
the ratio calculated with the number of listed ﬁrms audited by the Big Ten rises slightly. These results indicate
that the change in the CAS has not led to a change in the concentration of the audit market.
2.3. Product characteristics: audit opinion
An audit opinion is the judgment about a ﬁrm by auditors using accounting standards as the criterion. It
provides assurance of the information contained in ﬁnancial statements. We explore whether the change in the
CAS has aﬀected the type and content of audit opinions issued by audit ﬁrms, or more speciﬁcally whether the
characteristics of the product provided by audit ﬁrms has changed with the adoption of the new accounting
standards. Compared with the pre-2007 CAS, the new CAS place more emphasis on the professional judgment
of auditors. This may have caused a change in audit quality requirements. If the required audit quality has
increased, then auditors who possess greater professional knowledge are more likely to issue modiﬁed auditChart 2. Ratio of the revenue of Big Four (Big Ten) to the revenue of the 100 largest audit ﬁrms.
Chart 3. Ratio of the number of listed ﬁrms audited by the Big Four (Big Ten) to the total number of listed ﬁrms.
K. Zhu, H. Sun / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 187–198 191opinions (MAOs) when they audit the ﬁnancial statements of listed ﬁrms. The number of MAOs should thus
increase following the adoption of the new CAS. We examine the classiﬁed statistics on the audit opinions of
listed ﬁrms between 2002 and 2009 (see Table 1) and ﬁnd that the number of MAOs and the ratio of the num-
ber of MAOs to the total number of audit opinions slightly decreased over the period, which is contrary to our
conjecture. However, the decrease in the proportion of MAOs may in fact indicate that information disclosure
quality has improved. In all, there is no conclusive evidence to indicate that the implementation of the new
CAS has had a signiﬁcant impact on the structure of the audit opinions of listed ﬁrms from the perspective
of the industry structure of the audit market.
One of the most important characteristics of the new accounting standards is the adoption of fair value as a
measurement base, in compliance with the IFRS. This raises the question of whether, in issuing their opinions,
auditors pay more attention to the fair value factor since the change. To answer this question, we need to
investigate the speciﬁc reason why some listed ﬁrms were given MAOs after the adoption of the new CAS.
We examine all of the audit opinion reports and ﬁnd that the reasons why auditors issued MAOs are mainly
related to traditional problems such as uncertainty about accounts receivable, the possession of the funds of
listed ﬁrms by controlling shareholders and related parties, obscure long-term equity investments caused by
the losses of subsidiaries or aﬃliated companies, and so on, and that no ﬁrm was given an MAO because there
was some ﬂaw in the quality of information disclosed due to fair value. In all, we conclude that the change in
the CAS has not had a signiﬁcant impact on the content and quality of the products provided by auditors.
The results from these summary statistics show that the change in the CAS has not aﬀected the concentra-
tion of the audit market or the diﬀerentiation of audit products. However, we do ﬁnd that audit fees increased
signiﬁcantly after 2007. We thus argue that the change in CAS has caused expected audit risk to increase,
which has in turn caused an increase in audit fees.
Whatever the audit market structure, the marginal return of audit services is always equal to the marginal
cost in equilibrium, which is the condition that determines the audit price. As the audit market is not always
competitive, the equilibrium price may be higher than the marginal cost. If the increase in audit fees is caused
by supply side factors (audit market concentration and audit product diﬀerentiation), that is, if the increase in
audit fees is caused by an increase in the degree of monopoly, then the diﬀerence between the audit price and
its marginal cost will increase, which indicates that the resource allocation eﬃciency of the audit market willTable 1
Proportion of each type of audit opinion.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Clean opinion with emphasis of matter 8.31% 4.64% 5.00% 5.67% 5.56% 5.85 4.74% 4.85%
Modiﬁed opinion 3.50% 2.09% 3.77% 4.36% 2.67% 1.02 1.11% 0.73%
Disclaimer of opinion 1.63% 1.63% 2.17% 2.40% 2.06% 1.02 1.11% 1.07%
Adverse opinion 0.06
Proportion of MAOs 13.44% 8.36% 10.94% 12.44% 10.29% 7.95 6.95% 6.65%
Proportion of clean opinions 86.56% 91.64% 89.06% 87.56% 89.71% 92.05 93.05% 93.35%
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reasonable compensation for the elevated audit risk, then the increase is due to the increase in the marginal
cost of the audit. In this case, the diﬀerence between the audit price and its marginal cost has not widened,
which means that the resource allocation eﬃciency of the audit market has not deteriorated.
We now examine how the adoption of the IFRS-based accounting standards has aﬀected the expected audit
risk and the determination of price when the audit market is in equilibrium.
3. Reform of accounting standards and audit fees: Theoretical analysis
As both direct users and assurers of the accounting information of ﬁrms, auditors need to assess the rele-
vant audit risk based on the quality of the accounting information provided by ﬁrms. Accounting information
risk (accounting information quality) is an important factor aﬀecting audit risk. For example, when accrual
items are higher (accounting information quality is lower), auditors are more likely to issue MAOs (Bartov
et al., 2000), the probability of audit failure is greater (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002) and ﬁrms are more
likely to change auditors to obtain a clean opinion (DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998). These previous empir-
ical results indicate that changing accounting information quality will inﬂuence audit risk. There are some sim-
ilar empirical ﬁndings in China on this topic. For example, a return on equity (ROE) in the range of “Baopai”
[In China, if losses have been incurred for 3 years in succession in any listed ﬁrm, then the stock of the listed
ﬁrm is likely to be delisted. To avoid the occurrence of this situation, the listed ﬁrms will make use of various
measures to be proﬁtable and the behavior of these ﬁrms is called “Baopai”. The range of “Baopai” refers to
ROE that falls in the range of 0–2%] is an important factor that signiﬁcantly aﬀects annual audit fees (Lina,
2003). The ratio of the amount guaranteed by other ﬁrms to total assets and the ratio of accounts receivable to
total assets also signiﬁcantly aﬀect audit fees (Jixun et al., 2005). When listed ﬁrms change auditors, the new
auditors are prone to use the degree of earnings management of the ﬁrm to measure audit risk and require
higher fees as a result (Yanheng and Dequan, 2005). Audit fees are also positively related to the diﬀerence
between book income and taxable income (Qian and Zhou, 2005). These research results from China suggest
that the lower the accounting information quality of a ﬁrm, the higher the risk that auditors must bear and the
higher the audit fees that they require as compensation for the elevated risk. Although the CAS changed, the
ability of ﬁrms to generate cash ﬂow did not change and the impact of the change in the CAS on audit pricing
can thus be explained as the impact of the change of CAS on auditors’ expected audit risk.
As stated, an important characteristic of the new CAS is that it uses fair value as an additional basic mea-
surement attribute. When we examine the speciﬁc content of the new accounting standards, such as the stan-
dards on inventory, the restructuring of debt, consolidated ﬁnancial statements, ﬁnancial instruments and
income taxes, we note that there are many changes. In general, the new accounting standards are greatly dif-
ferent in content and the application of the standards has become more complicated. Thus, the ability and
professional judgment required of accountants is greater.
Under the old accounting standards, auditors formed stable expectations of the quality of accounting infor-
mation and the related audit risk of the ﬁrms that they audited. Under the new accounting standards, auditors
need to fully assess the audit risk of ﬁrms, especially the change in detection risk. The main factors of audit
risk – inherent risk and internal control risk – did not change with the change in accounting standards. How-
ever, due to the introduction of the fair value measurement, auditors must reevaluate the fairness of the dis-
closed accounting information. The consequence for the whole audit market is an increase in detection risk
and thus the overall audit risk, which has caused an increase in audit fees.
To control for the impact of the change in accounting standards on the comparability of ﬁnancial informa-
tion, listed ﬁrms in China had to disclosure how their net income under the old standards changed under the
new standards. Thus, there are two numbers for net income in 2006. Kai et al. (2009) argue that the adoption
of the new CAS will increase the expected uncertainty of investors about accounting information quality.
Under the old standards, investors could form relatively stable expectations about accounting information
quality. In the transition to the new accounting standards, however, these expectations disappeared and
new expectations had yet to be eﬀectively formed, which increased investors’ expected uncertainty about ﬁrms’
accounting information quality and increased the cost of capital of ﬁrms and reduced their value.
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ciﬁc aspects of ﬁrm risk: market risk and information disclosure risk. According to the old accounting rules,
which were based on historical costs, ﬁrms were not required to disclose their market risk. However, when the
new accounting standards were implemented for the ﬁrst time, the diﬀerence between the net income according
to the old and new accounting standards reﬂected the market risk faced by ﬁrms to a certain degree. Market
risk here refers to the potential impact of the change in the market price of assets on the continuing operations
of ﬁrms. Even if investors can obtain information about ﬁrms’ market risk through other channels, the duty of
auditors is to provide assurances about the accounting information disclosed in ﬁnancial reports. Once the
information relevant to the risk is disclosed in the ﬁnancial report, auditors must adjust their own risk expec-
tations. When the inﬂuence of the change in accounting standards on the new income information is greater,
the continued viability of the ﬁrms is more risky and the expected audit risk is higher. To compensate for the
elevated expected audit risk caused by the increase in market risk, auditors must demand higher audit fees.
This leads to our main hypothesis.
H1. The greater the impact of the change in CAS on ﬁrms’ accounting information, the greater the increase in
audit fees.4. Research design
4.1. Sample selection
We select 802 non-ﬁnancial listed ﬁrms that disclosed in their ﬁnancial reports the relevant adjustment data
about net income according to the rules for the ﬁscal year 2007 as our research sample. We exclude the fol-
lowing ﬁrms: (1) ﬁnancial ﬁrms; (2) ﬁrms for which the relevant data cannot be found (including observations
for which the audit fee or the value of equity is missing); and (3) ﬁrms with MAOs (including clean opinions
with an emphasis of matter, modiﬁed opinions, opinions with disclaimers and adverse opinions).
To test the main hypothesis, we construct the following model. Based on the research of Kai et al. (2009),
we use the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the old and new accounting standards (the degree of adjust-
ment between the two standards) as the proxy for the impact of the change in accounting standards on earn-
ings information, and test how this value is related to the change in audit fees. The speciﬁcation of the
variables is shown in Table 2.Chgfee ¼ b0 þ b1ABS ChgCAS þ b2Chgd þ b3Croeþ b4Creinþ b5Ccur þ b6Sizeþ b7Bigfour
þ b8Lbigfour þ b9Lossþ b10Llossþ b11Audchg þ b12Laudchg þ b13For þ e ð1ÞThe main explanatory variable ABS_ChgCAS is a proxy for the degree of adjustment between the old and
new accounting standards. According to the theoretical analysis, the greater the impact of the adoption of the
new CAS on the earnings information of ﬁrms, the higher the market risk embedded in earnings information
and the higher the audit fees paid. Thus, the coeﬃcient b1 of the main explanatory variable ABS_ChgCAS
should be signiﬁcantly positive.
The increase in audit fees may also be caused by an increase in auditors’ expenditure on learning the new
rules and carrying out their business. The new CAS based on fair value are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the old
CAS. As a result, auditors have had to study the new rules to use the new standards eﬀectively. When auditors
spend more time on or devote more energy to auditing, they charge higher audit fees in compensation. We
thus add Chgd to the model as a control variable.
According to the research of Simunic (1980), Wang (2002) and Bing et al. (2003), the main factors that aﬀect
audit fees include ﬁrm size, the complexity of the audit, the audit risk of the ﬁrm, the characteristics of the audit
ﬁrm and other characteristics of the audited ﬁrm.Much research indicates that ﬁrm size is the main determinant
of audit fees, and total assets are usually considered to control for the inﬂuence of size. Here, we use the natural
logarithm of the total assets of the ﬁrm (Size) to proxy for the size of the ﬁrm. We use the ratio of the sum of
accounts receivable and inventory to total assets (Rein) to proxy for the complexity of auditing the ﬁrm. Return
on equity (Roe), current ratio (cur) and a loss dummy variable (Loss) to measure the audit risk caused by ﬁrm
Table 2
Variable deﬁnitions.
Type of variable Name of
variable
Deﬁnition
Explained variable Chgfee The change in audit fees, calculated as (audit fees in 2007 – audit fees in 2006)/(total assets at
the end of 2006 according to the new accounting standards/1000)
Main explanatory
variable
ABS_ChgCAS The absolute value of the diﬀerence between net income in 2006 according to the new
accounting standards and that according to the old accounting standards/total assets at the
end of 2006 according to the new accounting standards
Control variables Days Days spent auditing, calculated as the number of days between the day when the ﬁnancial
report was announced to the public and the last day of the ﬁscal year
Chgd The change in the number of days spent auditing, calculated as the natural logarithm of the
days spent auditing the ﬁnancial report for 2007 minus the natural logarithm of the days spent
auditing the ﬁnancial report for 2006
Roe Return on equity (Roe), calculated as operational income dividend by equity
Croe The change in Roe, calculated as the Roe of the current year minus the Roe of the previous
year
Rein Proportion of accounts receivable and inventory to total assets
Crein The change in Rein, calculated as the Rein of the current year minus the Rein of the previous
year
Cur Liquidity ratio, calculated as the ratio of liquid assets to liquid debts
Ccur The change in Cur, calculated as the Cur of the current year net of the Cur of the previous year
Size Natural logarithm of total assets
Bigfour A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the audit ﬁrm is in the Big Four, and 0 otherwise
Lbigfour A dummy variable that is the lagged value of Bigfour
Loss A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the net income in the current year is negative,
and 0 otherwise
Lloss A dummy variable that is the lagged value of Loss
Audchg A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the audit ﬁrm changed in that year, and 0
otherwise
Laudchg A dummy variable that is the lagged value of Audchg
For A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm has B shares or H shares, and 0
otherwise
Sic Industry dummy variables. The manufacturing sector is diﬀerentiated by the ﬁrst two codes
and the other sectors by the ﬁrst code
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Four, to measure the main characteristic of the audit ﬁrm. Whether or not listed ﬁrms change auditors may
be correlated with instances where ﬁrms and auditors do not agree on the amount of audit fees payable. Thus
we use a dummy variable to control for this situation. Because the dependent variable is the change in audit fees,
we use the change in the continuous variables Roe, Rein and Cur (Croe, Crein, and Ccur) as control variables
and add the lagged variables (Lbigfour, Lloss, and Laudchg) of the indicator variables Bigfour, Loss and Aug-
chg as control variables. As the purpose of establishing the new accounting standards was to align with inter-
national conventions, the new CAS often refer to IFRS. As listed ﬁrms that have issued B shares or H shares are
more familiar with IFRS than those that have not issued such shares, the costs of implementing the new stan-
dards are diﬀerent for these two types of ﬁrms. Thus we add another dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the
listed ﬁrm has B shares or H shares (For) to control for this diﬀerence.
Finally, to remove the inﬂuence of potential outliers, we winsorize the top and bottom one percent of the
distributions of all of the continuous variables.5. Empirical results and analysis
5.1. Descriptive analysis
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that the average change in audit fees in 2007 is 0.0186. The
average audit fee in one thousand-yuan total assets caused by the reform of the CAS is about 0.02 yuan.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean Std. Min Max
Chgfee 802 0.0186 0.0989 0.4249 0.4494
ABS_ChgCAS 802 0.0084 0.0111 0 0.0545
Days 802 86.9726 24.2883 22 121
lnd 802 4.4148 0.3451 3.0910 4.7958
Chgd 802 0.0111 0.4085 1.3531 2.1102
Croe 802 0.0238 0.1554 1.2384 0.7566
Crein 802 0.0360 0.0803 0.2768 0.2598
Ccur 802 0.0301 0.6804 3.4115 2.2920
Size 802 21.6216 1.0519 18.0281 25.6966
Bigfour 802 0.0623 0.2419 0 1
Lbigfour 802 0.0648 0.2464 0 1
Loss 802 0.0599 0.2374 0 1
Lloss 802 0.0736 0.2612 0 1
Audchg 802 0.0848 0.2787 0 1
Laudchg 802 0.0736 0.2612 0 1
For 802 0.0137 0.1164 0 1
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which suggests that the diﬀerence in net income in one-thousand-yuan total assets is 0.8 yuan.
Days is the time between the end of the ﬁscal year and the announcement date of the ﬁnancial report, and
lnd is the natural logarithm of Days. Among the 802 ﬁrms, the shortest period is 22 days, the longest period is
121 days and the average period is 86.9726 days. Chgd is the diﬀerence between lnd in the current year and lnd
in the previous year. The average Chgd is 0.01, which suggests that the time spent on auditing ﬁnancial
reports in 2007 is only slightly less than the time spent in 2006, which implies that the change in the CAS
has not signiﬁcantly increased the time that audit ﬁrms spend auditing.5.2. Regression analysis
To control for the potential inﬂuence caused by sample selection bias, we ﬁrst use our sample to test the
model of Simunic (1980) and Gul (1999). If the result is generally consistent with the results in these past stud-
ies, then we can conclude that our ﬁndings are not caused by the uniqueness of the selected sample. The
descriptive statistics for the industry structure of the audit market suggest that audit fees increased signiﬁ-
cantly after the change in the CAS. The question then arises as to whether this increase in audit fees is due
to changes in the characteristics of ﬁrms or to the changes in the CAS. The foregoing analysis does not give
direct evidence on this, which is the question that the hypothesis testing is attempting to answer.
Table 4 shows the results of a regression using our sample of the main variables from the model of Simunic
(1980) and Gul (1999) to test for the inﬂuence of sample selection bias in our research sample and to test
whether audit fees increased signiﬁcantly following the change in the CAS.
The ﬁrst regression in Table 4 presents the results for the sample of all listed ﬁrms for the period 2004–2008.
The second regression presents the results for the sample excluding the observations from 2006, as we consider
2006 to be the transitional period during which the CAS changed. The sample in the third regression includes
only observations of listed ﬁrms that existed in all years between 2004 and 2008 (balanced panel data). The
regression results are generally consistent those reported by Simunic (1980) and Gul (1999). Speciﬁcally,
the coeﬃcient of Cur is signiﬁcantly negative, which suggests that the higher the liquidity of a ﬁrm, the lower
its ﬁnancial risk, the lower the audit risk and the lower the audit fee charged by auditors to audit the ﬁrm. The
coeﬃcient of Bigfour is signiﬁcantly positive, which means that the audit fees paid to the largest four audit
ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly greater than those paid to other audit ﬁrms. The coeﬃcients of Rein and Loss are posi-
tive as predicted, but the results are not statistically signiﬁcant. All of the results based on our sample are
generally consistent with previous results, indicating that there is no selection bias in our sample.
Table 4
Regression results for the traditional audit pricing model.
Explanatory variable Predicted sign (1) Coeﬃcient (t-value) (2) Coeﬃcient (t-value) (3) Coeﬃcient (t-value)
Intercept ? 4.2041*** 4.1840*** 3.9985***
(44.90) (40.25) (35.58)
After + 0.0237*** 0.0278*** 0.0244***
(4.236) (4.569) (3.637)
Roe ? 0.0580** 0.0988*** 0.0839***
(2.467) (4.306) (3.552)
Rein + 0.0278 0.0201 0.0084
(1.376) (0.888) (0.356)
Cur – 0.0091*** 0.0128*** 0.0098***
(3.536) (5.047) (4.055)
Size ? 0.1826*** 0.1817*** 0.1738***
(42.48) (38.04) (33.62)
Bigfour + 0.2509*** 0.2286*** 0.2522***
(15.47) (13.74) (12.19)
Loss + 0.0070 0.0184 0.0185
(0.554) (1.348) (1.186)
Audchg ? 0.0074 0.0048 0.0018
(0.681) (0.376) (0.127)
For ? 0.0638** 0.0509** 0.0557*
(2.225) (2.432) (1.768)
N 4421 3505 2550
industry control control control
R-squared 0.506 0.509 0.513
* indicate signiﬁcant at the p < 0.10 level.
** indicate signiﬁcant at the p < 0.05 level.
*** indicate signiﬁcant at the p < 0.01 level.
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positive and the magnitude of the coeﬃcient ranges from 2% to 3%, which suggests that audit fees increased
signiﬁcantly after the implementation of the new CAS in 2007 and 2008. In other words, the implementation
of the new CAS led the audit fees for every thousand yuan in assets to increase from 2% to 3%. The actual
audit fees increased from 6,00,000 yuan to 8,00,000 yuan after the adoption of the new CAS, an increase of
almost one third (80/60-1). Thus, the impact of the change in the CAS on audit market equilibrium pricing
is not only statistically signiﬁcant, but also economically signiﬁcant.
Table 5 presents the regression results for our main hypothesis test. The ﬁrst regression considers
ABS_ChgCAS to be the main independent variable and does not control for any other variables except for
industry. The second regression controls for all of the other variables. Whether or not we control for other
variables, the coeﬃcient of ABS_ChgCAS is signiﬁcantly positive at a signiﬁcance level of greater than 5%.
This result supports our main hypothesis that the larger the impact of the change in the CAS on ﬁrms’
accounting information, the greater the change in audit fees. This result is economically signiﬁcant. When
the diﬀerence in net income under the two standards increases by 1% in every thousand-yuan assets, the audit
fee increases by 0.79%.
To measure the potential inﬂuence of time spent auditing on audit fees, we add the period between the end
of the ﬁscal year and the announcement day of the yearly ﬁnancial report Chgd as the proxy for auditing time.
The results in Table 5 shows that the coeﬃcient of Chgd is negative but not signiﬁcant. This result suggests
that the actual time spent auditing does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the audit pricing decisions of auditors. The
coeﬃcients of Bigfour and Lbigfour are not statistically signiﬁcant, which conﬁrm the conclusion reached
from the descriptive statistics that the change in the CAS has not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced audit market con-
centration, and thus the concentration of the audit market does not have the ability to explain the change
in audit pricing. All of the other control variables are generally not statistically signiﬁcant, except for Audchg,
which is signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that the reason why ﬁrms replace their audit ﬁrm may be that they
do not want to pay excessive audit fees.
Table 5
Regression results for the main model.
Explanatory variable Predicted sign (1) Coeﬃcient (t-value) (2) Coeﬃcient (t-value)
Intercept ? 0.0024 0.1234
(0.0953) (1.404)
ABS_ChgCAS + 0.6496** 0.7907**
(2.042) (2.432)
Chgd + 0.0008
(0.0836)
Croe ? 0.0120
(0.425)
Crein ? 0.0480
(1.122)
Ccur ? 0.0010
(0.216)
Size ? 0.0055
(1.382)
Bigfour ? 0.0259
(0.350)
Lbigfour ? 0.0274
(0.372)
Loss ? 0.0019
(0.0867)
Lloss ? 0.0240*
(1.931)
Audchg ? 0.0296**
(2.237)
Laudchg ? 0.0134
(1.248)
For ? 0.0400
(0.896)
N 802 802
Industry Control Control
R-squared 0.0024 0.042
* indicate signiﬁcant at the p < 0.10 level.
** indicate signiﬁcant at the p < 0.05 level.
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This study investigates how the change in accounting standards in China in 2007 has inﬂuenced audit equi-
librium pricing. As auditors are the direct users of accounting information, the questions of whether and how
the change in accounting standards has aﬀected the industry structure and audit prices has become a common
concern for academics and business practitioners alike.
We investigate the impact of the change in the CAS on audit pricing from three dimensions: the concen-
tration of the audit market, the diﬀerentiation of audit products and audit risk. The results suggest that audit
fees increased signiﬁcantly after the adoption of the new CAS. However, the change in accounting standards
did not increase the concentration of the audit market signiﬁcantly, as larger audit ﬁrms have not displayed
scale superiority or further increased their market share. The structure of audit opinions (the ratio of the num-
ber of MAOs to the total number of audit opinions) as the ﬁnal product of audit services has also not changed
signiﬁcantly, and the speciﬁc reason why MAOs were issued in the sample period is not directly linked to the
change in the CAS. We thus argue that the change in the CAS has aﬀected audit pricing due to changes in
audit risk.
We analyze the potential inﬂuence of the change in the CAS on audit pricing from the perspective of infor-
mation disclosure risk. The change in accounting standards makes ﬁrms disclose more information that is rel-
evant to market risk, which increases ﬁrms’ information disclosure risk. As a consequence, auditors are
confronted with higher audit risk and charge higher fees as compensation.
198 K. Zhu, H. Sun /China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 187–198An important implication of our research is that the increase in audit fees during changes in accounting
standards should be considered as a potential cost of the reform of the rules. However, although audit fees
increase from the perspective of a single ﬁrm, the resource allocation eﬃciency of the audit market as a whole
does not deteriorate. This is because the marginal return is always equal to the marginal cost in equilibrium,
and it is the increase in audit risk caused by the change in the accounting standards that leads to an increase in
the marginal cost of auditing that elevates audit fees. That is, the change of rules does not widen the gap
between audit prices and the marginal cost of auditing, and does not lead to a deterioration of the resource
allocation eﬃciency of the audit market. However, the increase in the expected risk of auditors caused by the
diﬀerence between the old and new accounting standards causes auditors to pay more attention to audit risk
relative to asset value and to charge higher audit fees as a result. This can be regarded to a certain extent as a
signal to investors to pay more attention to the market risk of the operating activities of listed ﬁrms.
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